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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates a model of informational nudging. It focuses on a situa-
tion where a decision maker faces a set of alternatives. Each alternative brings a
certain stochastic reward/payoff to the decision maker. The decision maker/user
repeatedly chooses from the set of alternatives so as to maximize the reward she
obtains. The user remembers her past experiments and builds an estimate of the
reward of each alternative to make her future decision. The reward estimate is
built with the assumption that the user averages the reward of the alternative she
just chose with her past reward estimate, using a non summable, square summable
sequence of averaging factors, while leaving the estimate of the alternative she did
not choose unchanged.
The decision process is repeated over an infinite time horizon and the rela-
tive importance she gives to new experiment compared to her past experiment
decreases as time goes on. This is a key assumption to study the asymptotic be-
havior of the process, since we use stochastic averaging techniques. At each step
of the process the user chooses the alternative using her payoff estimate and a logit
rule.
With this model the user can only gather information about one alternative at
each step of the process, hence the estimate of a rarely chosen alternative is not
often updated.
Therefore we introduce a recommender who provides information about the
unchosen alternatives at every step, making it possible for the user to update the
payoff estimate of all alternatives at every step of the process. This modifies
the payoff estimate, modifies the subsequent choice of the users, i.e. the whole
decision process. We are particularly interested in studying the situation where
the recommender provides incorrect or misleading information to influence the
decision maker behavior, as a way to achieve more desirable equilibria. Building
on the theory of stochastic averaging, control strategies are derived to enforce a
desired equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
1.1 An illustrative problem
In order to motivate the problems and models studied in this thesis, consider the
simple situation below.
Assume that all commuters in a city have access to the same traffic recommen-
dation and navigation system, and that they can use it to access an estimate of the
travel time along every possible routes of interest. For simplicity, assume further
that each driver, you included, only has two alternative routes for commuting be-
tween two cities. Road A is a large highway, with speed limit 80 mph, whereas
Road B is a small state road as indicated by Figure 1.1. These two routes have
the same distance but differ by their travel time, hence when operating without
congestion Road A is ten minutes faster.
Figure 1.1: Road A and Road B description
You ask the recommender which road is faster and how long it will take you
to commute between the two cities. The recommender gathers data, computes
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and finally announces that according to its current measurement, Road A is faster.
Hence you choose Road A because you trust the recommender. After driving a few
miles, you enter Road A, only to find yourself stuck in a traffic jam as illustrated
in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Results of the congestion problem if all users rush to one alternative
What happened? Supposing that the recommender had perfect information and
reported it faithfully, how did this lead to this massive traffic jam? You decide
to just take it and wait (primarily because there is nothing else to do...), the only
positive thing is that you are not the only one stuck in your car. Thousands sur-
rounding you are experiencing the same problem. They probably used the recom-
mender and are wondering why they got stuck. They all naively thought as you
did that they would save time following the recommendation.
It does not take much effort to realize where the problem might have come
from. Since everyone was provided the same information, everyone reacted in the
same way, and made a decision that drastically changed the environment. The
result? Road B, which was looked down upon by everyone, is operating without
any traffic jam, while the supposedly faster Road A is massively congested. In
other words, difficulties occurred because the recommender was not strategic in
the information it released.
The goal of this thesis is to study such interactions between decision makers and
recommender. In particular, we investigate control strategies that allow a recom-
mender to strategically and usefully influence the decision makers’ choices. We
focus on simple situations where an individual or group of agents faces a set of
alternatives, each with an intrinsic but a priori unobservable value to the agent(s).
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These values, and the resulting decisions, are determined through repeated inter-
actions with the recommender, who publishes information in order to achieve a
socially efficient goal. To this end, it may provide different feedback to different
users and, when convenient, ”lie” to them, by providing reports that misrepresent
the intrinsic value.
While the main model considered here is not directly applicable to the kind of
transportation applications discussed above (because, in this case, each decision
makers reward the experienced travel time depends on the decisions of all oth-
ers), it is appropriate to describe other decision maker/recommender interactions
such as advertising, propaganda, or true recommendations about the quality of a
good. It may also be of value for other urban planning and emergency evacuation
scenarios. For example, a city may have two bridges, B1 and B2, with bridge B1
faster than bridge B2 on average, no matter how many people are taking it. If B1’s
structure cannot withstand the full population of commuters, however, it might be
necessary for a management authority to find ways to divert traffic away from it.
In the events that it is impossible for the city to
• increase a pre-existing toll on B1
such information-based influences may be the most efficient, motivating our study.
1.2 Contribution and organization of the dissertation
1.2.1 Contribution
This thesis considers mathematical models of human decision–making processes
and their influence. It specifically deals with the concept of a nudge which can be
seen as a white lie, it is a substantially non controlling action that makes a decision
maker change his behavior. The entire thesis deals with how a decision maker
reacts to a nudge, which in our case is a biased information about an alternative
the decision maker did not experiment. More precisely,
• We adapt a mathematical model from Cominetti [1] to create a coherent
mathematical framework describing a specific repeated decision making sit-
uation. In this situation, a user faces several alternatives indexed by a, each
of which brings a different stochastic reward with mean ra. The user re-
peatedly chooses and wants to maximize the reward she gets. Therefore she
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remembers her past experiences and builds an estimator for the utility of
each alternative. At each timestep, she uses this estimate to make a choice,
using a logit choice rule first introduced by McFadden [2]. Using stochastic
algorithm techniques from Borkar [3], this discrete repeated choice process
is asymptotically tracked by an ODE.
- Using this model, considering the user trusts the recommender, we
introduced a recommender acting as a choice architect. He provides
misleading information, in order to move the user’s belief toward an
equilibrium, the recommender thinks is desirable. The model and its
implications are extensively discussed in Chapter 2.
- Using the ODE limit, we derived constant and adaptive nudging strate-
gies to move the user toward the desired equilibrium.
- Using stochastic algorithm techniques we introduce a second time
scale to monitor the user’s choice in order to develop adaptive nudging
strategies that are more efficient than the constant one.
• The model is further extended to make the choices of user more realistic.
Specifically a credibility metric is introduced to measure how much the rec-
ommender is credible to determine whether the user is going to believe him
or not. In practice we investigated two cases
- bounded lying strategies
- the situation where the recommender is not fully credible through nu-
merical simulations.
1.2.2 Dissertation organization
• Chapter 2 of the dissertation starts by simplifying the model developed by
Cominetti [1] to fit our framework. In this chapter the notion of reward,
user, and recommender are extensively discussed and relevant tools from
the theory of stochastic algorithm are introduced.
• Chapter 3 gives more insight into the logit model developed by McFadden
[2], and also discusses its connections with the notion of quantal response
equilibrium.
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• Chapter 4 discusses the use of constant strategies to nudge a naive user.
This chapter uses tools from the theory of nonlinear dynamics to analyse
the stability of the learning process. This chapter also discusses a two-
alternative model in which we uncovered an interesting framing effect.
• Chapter 5 introduces adaptive lying strategies, which can be seen as closed
loop strategies. Nudging strategies of this type are derived and analysed
using two time scale analysis as introduced in Borkar [3].
• Chapter 6 introduces a credibility feedback loop, which accounts for the
fact that the user’s trust in the recommender may itself vary as a function of
its lying history.
1.3 Literature review
The work presented here bears a number of connections with other approaches for
influencing decision-makers and controlling shared infrastructures. The closest in
spirit to our study is ”nudging”, because it also relies on informational exchanges,
instead of monetary incentives, to shape a decision-maker’s choices. This is in
contrast with traditional congestion pricing, which is reviewed next.
1.3.1 Congestion Pricing
Congestion pricing is an approach to reduce congestion, however public reluc-
tance has limited his deployment. Using license plate recognition London charges
for any car entering in a defined cordon around the city. According to Santos [4],
this naive charge drastically decreased congestion, leading to an increase from
14.3km/h to 16.7 km/h of the downtown average velocity. Stockholm imple-
mented a more sophisticated toll scheme that is time-varying from $1.6 to $3.2
within the day. Eliasson [5] showed significant decrease in the traffic congestion
due to this pricing. Both theoretical and empirical evidence tend to show that
congestion pricing reduces congestion. Critics claim that this policy may unfairly
penalize low income people while benefiting the wealthier. Studies on the social
effect [5] tend to show that the impact is limited (see Figure 1.4). Thus conges-
tion pricing techniques works well but one could think about alternative way of
influencing people’s way of commuting, to benefit society.
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Figure 1.3: Improvement of the travel time after introducing congestion pricing
Figure 1.4: Impact of the congestion pricing policy on the income
1.3.2 Learning and mental Representation
One of the major concerns while studying this problem was to come up with an
adapted mental model. Indeed a decision maker will try to take the best possible
decision, hence she needs to build a mental model of the situation. Jay Wright
Forrester gave one of the first definitions of a mental model:
The image of the world around us, which we carry in our head, is just a model.
Nobody in his head imagines all the world, government or country. He has only
selected concepts, and relationships between them, and uses those to represent the
real system.
Johnson [6], in his book specified what one was considering when looking at a
mental model. A mental model has a relation structure to the process it models and
hence can be useful explanatory high grade simulation. Johnson also emphasizes
there will always be an aspect of human mentality that cannot be captured by
models. He illustrates his points using Turing Machine and states that ”models
contain elements that are merely imitation of reality, there is no working model
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of how their counterparts in the wild operate but only procedure that mimic their
behavior”.
Hence Cominetti makes a reasonable assumption [1] when considering users
take into account their past experiences and average them in a certain way. One
could question the assumption that the importance of new experiment decreases as
time goes on. But this model still includes the beliefs, experiences and values. The
use of the logit model for the choice also accounts for the biases of the individual
with respect to the norm.
1.3.3 Nudging
Thaler and Sunstein (TS in the following paragraph) [7] in their book defined the
notion of nudging. They question the common Libertarian belief, that is all peo-
ple almost all of the time make choices that are in their best interest, or at very
least, are better than the choice that would have been made by someone else. TS
advocate that giving people a huge number of choices, combined with no influ-
ence, might not be the best for them. For them introducing a choice architect
helps people live happier and longer. A choice architect is an entity influencing
people in their decision without the people really noticing it. TS illustrate this
notion taking the example of a school cafeteria, where they look at the influence
of the way food was placed, resulting food selection of the students. The choice
architect first placed fruit at eye level making unhealthy desert less accessible, and
then switched. Surprisingly, placing fruit at eye level increased the student con-
sumption of fruit. In the first case kids would tend to eat more fruit, hence have
a healthier diet. The choice architect, just by modifying food disposition nudged
the kids. He helped them making an healthier choice without putting too many
constraints on them. A nudge, unlike a lie or a law, has to be substantially non
controlling. Had the choice architect banned unhealthy desert from the cafete-
ria or pretended these were toxic, then he would not have nudged the users but
influenced them with stronger means.
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CHAPTER 2
MODEL DESCRIPTION
We consider a variation of the model originally proposed in [1]. A user repeatedly
faces a set A = {a1, ...,aK} of K alternatives, each of which is associated with a
true reward ra (see Figure 2.1).
2.1 Decision-making process
After a choice is made at round n, an announced reward wa(n) is reported by the
recommender for each alternative. These announced rewards depend on the user’s
choice and may differ from the true reward ra due to the recommender’s active
influence. Based on the announced reward, the user updates her payoff perception
vector x according to:
xa(n+1) = (1− γ(n))xa(n)+ γ(n)wa(n), (2.1)
for all a, where γ(n) is a square summable, non-summable sequence, i.e.
lim
n→+∞γ(n) = 0,
∞
∑
n=1
γ(n) = ∞,
∞
∑
n=1
γ(n)2 < ∞. (2.2)
The user then chooses an alternative in the next round according to the probability
distribution
Prob(Alternative a is chosen) =Πa(x) =
eβxa
K
∑
q=1
eβxq
. (2.3)
This is the well known logit choice model introduced by [2] and used exten-
sively in discrete choice theory. This model also makes similar assumptions about
decision–making as parts of the literature on bounded rationality (in particular,
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the notion of quantal response equilibrium), and is thus consistent with our desire
to capture a nudging–type influence. More details about this choice model and
its interpretation are given in Chapter 3.One should note that logit rule implies
Πa(x) 6= 1 and Πa(x) 6= 0 ∀a ∈ A, which will be extensively used in subsequent
derivations.
Yet another way to interpret model (2.1), (2.3), is to think of Πa(x) not as
the probability that a single decision maker will choose alternative a, but as the
fraction of a population of decision makers (all of which share the same intrinsic
characteristics and desirability vector x for all alternatives) that will pick a.
This is consistent with McFadden’s own justification of the logit choice model
[2], and allows one to also think of our proposed nudging strategy as a way for
a recommender to modify the decisions of a group of decision makers, provided
they all receive the same information from it.
2.2 Modeling the influence of the recommender
We are interested in situations where the recommender may manipulate the an-
nounced rewards so as to eventually drive the user’s choice to a desirable one, as
defined by the recommender. Accordingly, we assume that the announced rewards
take the form
wa(n) =
ra w.p. Πa(x(n))ra+ la(n) w.p. (1−Πa(x(n))). (2.4)
In words, this means that the recommender lies about the true reward for an
alternative a by an amount la(n) every time a is not chosen (and hence, presum-
ably, every time it is impossible for the user to directly check the true value of
the reward at the round n, this is illustrated in Figure 2.4 ). Of course, such
a scenario is not realistic if rewards {ra} are truly constant, since the user then
just needs to choose every alternative once to uncover the value of the true re-
ward, and has no reason to ever believe the recommender later on when a lie is
announced. Note that it is also because these options are available to the user that
the necessary conditions of “substantial non-controllability” are satisfied and that
the mechanism considered here is a nudge. Thankfully, as explained e.g. by [3],
the analysis presented here is valid (and yields the same fluid limit and asymptotic
behavior) if rewards are considered to be random variables rather than constant
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and deterministic.
This is explained in more detail after Proposition 2.2.1. From (2.1) and (2.4),
we obtain the discrete stochastic difference equation
xa(n+1)− xa(n) =
γ(n)(ra− xa(n)) w.p. Πa
(
x(n)
)
γ(n)(ra+ la(n)− xa(n)) w.p. 1−Πa
(
x(n)
) (2.5)
for all a ∈ A.
The central question of interest, then, is whether there exists a strategy {la(n)}n>0a∈A
such that the dynamics described by (2.5) converge to a payoff vector x∗ that cor-
responds to a desirable probability distribution vector pi∗. In order to answer this
question, we study the asymptotic behavior of (2.5) using the ODE / fluid method
considered by [8], which takes advantage of the properties of {γ(n)}. More pre-
cisely, calling upon Corollary 5.4 by [8], we can state the following:
Proposition 2.2.1. Assume that the system of ordinary differential equations (ODE)
dxa
dt
= E(wa(x) | {xa(s)}ns=0)− xa
= ra− xa+ la(x)(1−Πa(x))∀a ∈ A (2.6)
admits a unique globally asymptotically stable equilibrium. Then the sequence
{x(n)}n≥0 of random vectors defined by (2.5) converges to this equilibrium almost
surely.
We will henceforth mostly concern ourselves with ODE (2.6), with the under-
standing that stability results can only be interpreted directly in terms of {x(n)}n≥0
in the case of global asymptotic stability. Before doing so, however, we note again
that Proposition 2.2.1 still holds unchanged if, instead of representing mere deter-
ministic and constant variables, each ra(n) and la(n) is meant to designate the
mean of a random variable of the form
r˜a(n) = ra+κa(n) (2.7)
l˜a(n) = la(n)+θa(n) (2.8)
where κa(n) and θa(n) are independent martingales. In this case, the recom-
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mender’s use of the random announced reward
w˜a(n) =
ra+κa(n) w.p. Πa(x(n))ra+ la+κa(n)+θa(n) w.p. (1−Πa(x(n))) (2.9)
in lieu of (2.4) yields to the same value of conditional expectation E(w˜a(n) |
{xa(s)}ns=0) and, hence, same ODE as (2.6).
2.3 Figures
Figure 2.1: Initial problem description, the user chooses an alternative among an
arbitrary number of K alternatives to maximize his reward
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Figure 2.2: Example of one step of the repeated process where user chooses an
alternative among a set of K alternatives.
Figure 2.3: New problem description, the user chooses an alternative among an
arbitrary number of K alternatives to maximize his reward, in the presence of a
recommender
12
Figure 2.4: Example of one step of the repeated process in presence of a
recommender
13
CHAPTER 3
LOGIT PROBABILITY MODEL
In Chapter 2, we modeled the user’s decision process using the logit probability
model introduced in [2]. In this chapter, we provide some additional justification
and discussion about this model in the context of our work.
3.1 Discrete choice theory
3.1.1 Problem Motivation
Suppose a car manufacturer wants to predict the number of sales he will make in
the following year. This car manufacturer produces three types of vehicles, a sub
compact model, a SUV model, and a family minivan. The set of alternatives will
be called B. Each car from the set B is described by a vector of attributes x j. This
vector of attributes x j contains the car’s price, the fuel efficiency, and its interior
volume.
xTsub = [15000,100,5] (3.1)
xTSUV = [30000,60,10] (3.2)
xTmini = [25000,80,12] (3.3)
The car manufacturer has data about last year’s sales. For every sold car he knows
the purchaser’s age, income and number of children. Hence a buyer will be de-
scribed by a vector of measured attribute s containing these consumer specific
data. The car manufacturer wants to derive a model predicting the probability that
a certain type of consumer buys a certain type of car, i.e. he wants to link x and s.
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3.1.2 Model Derivation
The first assumption of the model is that the buyer’s utility is represented by a
stochastic function U of his attributes and of car attributes. Namely
U(s,x) = v(s,x)+ ε(s,x) (3.4)
where v(s,x) is a deterministic function and ε(s,x) a random one. Just to fix ideas
the utility of a 50 year old person with three children and an income of $50,000,
buying a SUV is given by
U

 5050000
3
 ,
 3000060
10

 . (3.5)
The buyer s described by this utility function will choose the SUV if it brings him
more utility than the minivan and the sub compact. Mathematically speaking
U(s,xSUV )≥U(s,xmini) and U(s,xSUV )≥U(s,xsub) (3.6)
Because of the random term these inequalities can only be defined in a probabilis-
tic sense. Hence we are interested in the probability of the event ”SUV brings
more utility than the other two cars”, PSUV .
PSUV = P[ε(s,xsub)− ε(s,xSUV )≤ v(s,xSUV )− v(s,xsup) and (3.7)
ε(s,xmini)− ε(s,xSUV )≤ v(s,xSUV )− v(s,xmini)] (3.8)
If we have access to the joint probability distribution Fj of ε(s,x j) we can derive
probability PSUV .
PSUV =
ε=∞∫
ε=−∞
FSUV (ε+ vmini− vSUV ,ε,ε+ vsub− vSUV )dε (3.9)
However directly postulating a density function, integrating it, and calibrating
the parameters afterwards to fit the data is computationally hard. The logit model
avoids this difficulty by making use of a specific distribution. Before going further
we introduce a more formal model. We let X denote the universe of objects of
choice, S the universe of vectors of measured attribute of decision makers. An
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individual drawn at random from the population will be described by his vector
attribute s and will face some finite set of available alternatives B⊆X . P(x | s,B) is
the conditional probability that an individual drawn at random choose alternative
x, given that he had measured attributes s and faces the alternative set B. Following
McFadden [2] the model is derived using three axioms.
Axiom 3.1.1. The probability P(x | s,B) > 0 for all possible alternative sets B,
vectors of measured attributes s, and x ∈ B.
In words, the selection probabilities are all positive for all the possible alterna-
tive sets in the experiment.
Axiom 3.1.2. The odds of x j being chosen over xi where i 6= j in a multiple choice
situation equals the odds of a binary choice of xi over x j, i.e. for every alternative
set B.
P(y | s,{x,y})
P(x | s,{x,y}) =
P(y | s,B)
P(x | s,B) (3.10)
In our example it means the presence of the sub compact in the choice set does
not modify how much the buyer prefers the minivan over the SUV. When the buyer
makes his choice he compares one alternative to another, and not three alternatives
at a same time.
These two axioms imply a particular form for the probability choice. The prob-
ability of choosing alternative x over every other alternative is the exponential
of the utility brought by x divided by the sum of the exponential of the utilities
brought by the other alternative.
Proof. Consider a choice set B containing three alternatives x,y,z and let
pxy = P(x | s,{x,y}). As a convention pxx = 1/2. From (3.10)
P(y | s,B) = pyx
pxy
P(x | s,B), (3.11)
and
1 = ∑
y∈B
P(y | s,B) =
(
∑
y∈B
pyx
pxy
)
P(x | s,B), (3.12)
Hence
P(x | s,B) = 1
∑y∈B(pyx/pxy)
. (3.13)
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We then express pyx/pxy using equation (3.10) permuting indices x,y,z.
pyx
pxy
=
pyz/pzy
pxz/pzx
(3.14)
Taking z to be a ”benchmark” member of the alternative set B and defining V (s,x,z)=
log(pxz/pzx), then
P(x | s,B) = e
V (s,x,z)
∑y∈B eV (s,y,z)
. (3.15)
To finish we make another assumption, on the irrelevance of the Alternative Set
Effect as stated in the following lemma.
Axiom 3.1.3. The function V(s,x,z) determining the the selection probabilities in
Equation (3.15) has the additively separable form
V (s,x,z) = v(s,x)− v(s,z) (3.16)
To understand this condition let us come back to our quick illustrative exam-
ple. Looking at the probability ratio between choosing a minivan and a SUV,
pSUV,mini/pmini,SUV , we have V (s,xSUV ,xmini)= log(pSUV,mini/pmini,SUV ). It seems
reasonable to think that the probability ratio is going to depend on the ratio of
the utilities brought by each alternative. That is roughly pSUV,mini/pmini,SUV =
U(s,xSUV )/U(s,xmini) where U is the utility function. Hence
V (s,xSUV ,xmini) = log(pSUV,mini/pmini,SUV ) (3.17)
= log(U(s,xSUV ))− log(U(s,xmini) (3.18)
= v(s,xSUV )− v(s,xmini) (3.19)
Plugging this third axiom into (3.15) yields
P(x | s,B) = e
v(s,x)
∑y∈B ev(s,y)
. (3.20)
The question is now how to find a probability distribution satisfying the latter
equation.
A distribution satisfying this property is the Weibull distribution. Recall that
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the utility brought to buyer s when choosing alternative x is given by
U(s,x) = v(s,x)+ ε(s,x) (3.21)
Suppose the values ε(s,x j) are independently identically distributed with the Weibull
distribution.
P(ε(s,x j)≤ ε) = e−e−ε (3.22)
The former equation satisfies
Fi(ε+ vi− v1, ...,ε, ...,ε+ vi− v j) (3.23)
= exp(−ε)
J
∏
j=1, j 6=i
exp(−exp(−ε− vi+ v j) (3.24)
= exp(−ε)exp
{
− [exp(−ε)]
[
J
∑
j=1, j 6=i
exp(v j− vi)
]}
(3.25)
Setting αi = ∑Jj=1, j 6=i exp(v j− vi)> 0 we observe
(1/αi)
de−e−εαi
dε
= Fi (3.26)
Hence
Pi =
∫ ε=∞
ε=−∞
Fidε =
1
αi
[
e−αie
−ε]∞
−∞
=
1
αi
=
evi
∑ j∈B ev j
(3.27)
For further result one can look at the reference [2].
3.2 Quantal response equilibrium
This section is based on the paper of McKelvey [9], who applied the McFadden [2]
techniques to a normal form game. As in the previous section we will emphasize
the main ideas of the theory through an example. For a detailed and rigorous proof
of the theory the reader is invited to refer directly to the aforementioned article.
Following McKelvey [9]:
consider a finite n− person game in normal form. The set of players N =
{1, ...,n} is indexed by i. Each player i∈N has a pure strategy set Si = {si1, ...,siJi},
each strategy will be denoted by the index j. We further define S = ∏Ji=1 Si,the
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payoff i obtains is described by a payoff function ui : S→ R. ∆i denotes the set
of probability measures on Si and the probability player i chooses strategy j is
given by a function pi : Si → R. In particular the probability player i chooses
strategy j is given by pi j = pi(si j). We now introduce ∆ = ∏i∈N ∆i, J = ∑i∈N Ji
and we denote pi = (pi1, ..., piJ1) ∈ ∆i the probability distribution of player i over
his possible strategies. For convenience we define p = (p1, ..., pN) the vector that
concatenates all players probabilities, and we use the abusive notation si j to de-
scribe the probability distribution pi whose every component is zero except the
jth one. We will make use of the notation p = (pi, p−i), where pi represents the
probability distribution of player i, and p−i, the probability distribution of all the
other players, the notation (si j, p−i) represents strategy where i adopts the pure
strategies si j and all the other player play their strategies according to p. We now
extend the definition of the payoff function to the domain ∆,ui(p) =∑s∈S p(s)ui(s)
where p(s) =∏i∈N pi(si).
A vector p = (p1, ..., pn) ∈ ∆ is a Nash Equilibrium if for all i ∈ N and all
p
′
i ∈ ∆i, ui(p
′
i, p−i) ≤ ui(p). Write Xi = RJi , to represent the space of possible
payoffs for strategies that player i might adopt, and X = ∏ni=1 Xi. We define the
function u : ∆→ X by
u(p) = (u1(p), ...,un(p)) (3.28)
where
ui j(p) = ui(si j, p−i) (3.29)
Now we define the quantal response, the strategy player i plays when payoff is
perturbed by a random term. Specifically, for each i and each j ∈ {1, ...,Ji}, and
for any p ∈ ∆, define
uˆi j(p) = ui j(p)+ εi j (3.30)
Where player i’s error vector, εi = (εi1, ...,εiJi) is distributed according to a joint
distribution with cumulative distribution function Fi(εi).
3.2.1 Example
Consider the game presented in Figure 3.1, where N.E stands for Nash equilib-
rium. Here the set N = {1,2} is made of two players, and for each player i the
set of available strategy is Si = {1,2,3}. Now consider S =∏i=2i=1 Si and define the
payoff function ui : S→R presented in Figure 3.1. The vector p= (p1, p2) will be
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the probability distribution over ∆ and the payoff function definition is extended
to ∆ by
u(p) = (u1(p),u2(p)) (3.31)
Player wants to maximize their payoff, hence the the Nash Equilibrium strategy
profile p∗ is the one satisfying
ui(p′i, p−i)≤ ui(p∗)∀i ∈ N, p′i ∈ ∆i (3.32)
Suppose now that the payoff is perturbed by a random term having the Weibull
distribution, which defines a new payoff uˆi j.
uˆi j(p) = ui j(p)+ εi j (3.33)
Because of the randomness added player can only maximize his payoff in a prob-
abilistic sense. The event choosing strategy j (C j) happens when the choice of
strategy i gives the highest payoff. That is
C j =
{
ui j + εi j ≥ uik + εik ∀k ∈ J
}
(3.34)
=
{
εi j ≤ εik +uik−ui j
}
(3.35)
The probability player i chooses strategy j denoted pii j = σi j(ui j) is then given by
pii j =
∫ ε=∞
ε=−∞
Fi j(ε+ui1−ui j, ...,ε+ui1−uiJ) (3.36)
Hence the quantal response vector pi ∈ ∆ which differs from the mixed Nash equi-
librium p, because of the presence of uncertainties. The function σi : RSi → ∆Si
the is quantal response function of player i. A few results can be easily derived
for this function:
1. σ ∈ ∆ is non empty
2. σi is continuous on RSi
3. σi j is monotonically increasing in ui j
4. If ∀i ∈ Nand ∀k ∈ S, εi j and εik are i.i.d., then for all u, ∀u, ∀i, and ∀ j,k ∈ S
ui j > uik⇒ σi j(u)> σik(u) (3.37)
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3.2.2 The Logit Equilibrium
Suppose the εi j are i.i.d and have an extreme value distribution with cumulative
density function
Fi(εi j) = e−e
−βεi j−κ
(3.38)
The mean µ and the variance σ2 of this distribution are given by
µ =−κ
β
+
γ
β
(3.39)
σ2 =
pi2
6
1
β
(3.40)
where in this special case γ is the Euler constant. One can observe that β → 0
makes the mean and the variance of the error large while β → ∞ makes the error
small. As a rule of thumb, the bigger β is the closer to the unperturbed payoff the
payoff is. Hence player will choose the strategy corresponding to the unperturbed
Nash Equilibrium. The quantal response using a logit equilibrium is:
pii j =
eβxi j
∑k=J
i
k=1 eβxik
(3.41)
where the xi j represents the certain part of the payoff, i.e xi j = ui j(p) This equi-
librium can be viewed as a payoff regularization by the factor β . Remember
the example given in Figure 3.1 at the beginning of the section. On one hand if
no error is added to payoff matrix (β → ∞) players will play Nash Equilibrium
(R,B) with probability one because (u1R,u2B) brings the highest payoff. Indeed
eβu1R  eβu1C and eβu1R  eβu1L imply
pi1R =
eβu1R
eβu1R + eβu1C + eβu1L
(3.42)
=
1
1+(eβu1C/eβu1R)+(eβu1L/eβu1R)
(3.43)
≈ 1 (3.44)
On the other hand if the error is very large (β → 0), it is the dominating part of
the payoff. Hence no matter how big the certain part of the payoff is, player will
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randomize his choice. For player 1 eβu1R ≈ eβu1C ≈ 1 and eβu1R ≈ eβu1L ≈ 1 imply
pi1R =
eβu1R
eβu1R + eβu1C + eβu1L
(3.45)
≈ 1
1+1+1
=
1
3
(3.46)
3.3 Figures
Figure 3.1: Example of a game with a unique Nash Equilibrium
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CHAPTER 4
CONSTANT RECOMMENDER
STRATEGIES
We now go back to the nudging problem of Chapter 2. Recall that the recom-
mender’s goal is to choose a strategy l∗ = (l∗1 , ..., l
∗
K) such that dynamics (2.6)
asymptotically converge to the set of payoff perception vectors corresponding to
a desired probability distribution pi∗. Note that this set is typically not a single-
ton, as can be seen, e.g., by considering the simple case of two alternatives, with
pi∗ =
(1
2 ,
1
2
)
. In this case, every payoff perception vector of the form α(1,1)T ,
α ∈ R produces the same distribution pi∗. In this section, we focus on constant
strategies that drive the dynamics to a single element of that set, although consid-
ering controls that make the full set a limit set of the dynamics would also be of
interest. We consider such strategies first because they require very low attention
on the recommender’s part and, as we will show, can in some cases enforce almost
any equilibrium effectively.
We first derive a condition on l∗ that guarantees that an appropriate equilibrium
is created, and then investigate additional requirements for its (global) stability.
4.1 Model with arbitrary number of alternatives
Proposition 4.1.1. System (2.6) admits an equilibrium corresponding to pi∗ under
the constant strategy l∗ = (l∗1 , ...l
∗
K) if and only if there exists a scalar s ∈ R and
index i such that
l∗a(n) =
s− ra+(1/β )ln(pi∗a/pi∗i )
1−pi∗a
(4.1)
for all a ∈ A and all n≥ 0.
Proof. Assume that (4.1) holds for some s and i and define x¯ by x¯a = s+(1/β )ln(pi∗a/pi∗i )
for all a. Then, we claim that x¯ is an equilibrium. Indeed, notice that, for all a,
eβ x¯a = eβ s
pi∗a
pi∗i
. (4.2)
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Hence, Πa(x¯) = e
β x¯a
∑ j e
β x¯ j
= pi∗a , i.e., Π(x¯) = pi∗. From this, it is also clear that
ra− x¯a+ l∗a(1−Πa(x¯)) = 0
for all a, i.e., that x¯ is an equilibrium. The converse implication can be shown
from the same algebra, by essentially reversing the steps.
We now turn our attention to the local stability of a desired equilibrium. To this
end, we compute the Jacobian J(x) at that point, when a strategy of the form (4.1)
is applied to the system. Noting that
dΠa
dxq
(x) =
βΠa(x)(1−Πa(x)) if q = a−βΠa(x)Πq(x) if q 6= a
find that
J(x) =

−1−β l∗1pi∗1 (1−pi∗1 ) ... β l∗1pi∗1pi∗K
β l∗2pi
∗
2pi
∗
1 ... β l
∗
2pi
∗
2pi
∗
K
... ... ...
... ... ...
β l∗Kpi∗Kpi∗1 ... −1−β l∗Kpi∗K(1−pi∗K)
 (4.3)
whenever equilibrium x corresponds to the desired probability distribution pi∗.
From this, we can use Gershgorin’s theorem to derive the following sufficient
conditions for local stability.
Proposition 4.1.2. If l∗a >− 1βpi∗a (1−pi∗a )− | l∗a |+l∗a >− 1βpi∗a (1−pi∗a ) (4.4)
for all a ∈ {1, ...,A}, then the equilibrium corresponding to pi∗ is locally stable.
Proof. The first condition in (4.4) is equivalent to the center of every Gershgorin
circle being located in the complex left half plane, while the second condition is
equivalent to the radius of each circle being smaller than the distance between the
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center and the origin. Indeed,
K
∑
q=1,q6=a
| Jaq(x) |= β | l∗a | pi∗a (1−pi∗a ) (4.5)
and thus the radius is smaller if and only if
|1+β ∗l∗api∗a (1−pi∗a )|> β |l∗a |(1−pi∗a )pi∗a .
Taking into account the first condition in (4.4) then yields the stated inequality.
Combining Proposition 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, we can state the following achievability
result.
Theorem 4.1.3. For every desired probability pi∗, there exists a constant recom-
mender strategy l∗ (with l∗a > 0 for all a) that creates and locally stabilizes an
equilibrium corresponding to pi∗.
Proof. Note that local stability condition (4.4) is always trivially satisfied if l∗a > 0
for all a. It is thus enough to choose a strategy of the form (4.1) such that all lies
are positive. This can be achieved by picking any s > maxa ra and i = argmin j pi∗j
in the characterization of Proposition 4.1.1.
With this characterization in hand, and in light of Proposition 2.2.1, it is natural
to ask whether something more can be obtained, namely, whether global asymp-
totic stability of a desired equilibrium is achievable as well. Gershgorin’s theorem
can likewise be used to derive sufficient conditions toward answering this ques-
tion.
Proposition 4.1.4. Let M be defined as M = max
p6=q
| l∗p+ l∗q |. Then, if
l∗a >−
4
β
and (−M
2
+ l∗a)>−
4
β
(4.6)
for all a∈A, system (2.6) has a unique, globally asymptotically stable equilibrium
corresponding to pi∗ = (pi∗1 , ...,pi
∗
K), to which the sequence {x(n)}n≥0 defined by
(2.5) also converges almost surely.
Proof. From contraction theory ([10]), we know that a sufficient condition for the
equilibrium point of (2.6) to be globally asymptotically stable is the existence of
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δ > 0 such that the symmetric part of the Jacobian satisfy
Jsym(x) =
1
2
(JT (x)+ J(x))  −δ I for all x.
Using Gershgorin’s theorem again, a sufficient condition for this to hold is
l∗a >−
1
βΠa(x)(1−Πa(x))
and
1+β l∗aΠa(x)(1−Πa(x))>
MβΠa(x)(1−Πa(x))
2
for all a and x, where we have used the fact that
K
∑
q=1,q 6=a
| [Jsym(x)]aq |< MβΠa(x)(1−Πa(x))2 , ∀a
in the second inequality. Now, noting that Πa(x)(1−Πa(x)) < 14 for all x and a,
we see that (4.6) is a sufficient condition for this latter inequality to hold.
4.2 Model with two alternatives
The previous section presented sufficient conditions for stability in the general
case, and showed that every desirable equilibrium can be created and locally sta-
bilized with a constant recommender strategy. In this section we focus on the
simpler case of two alternatives (K = 2), and characterize the full set of asymp-
totic behaviors achievable with constant recommender strategies. In particular,
we show that a poor choice of lies can result in unstable equilibria, which has
implications for robustness of these strategies.
When only two choices are offered to the user the differential system reduces
to [
x˙1
x˙2
]
=
 −x1+ r1+ l1(1− 11+eβ (x2−x1))
−x2+ r2+ l2 11+eβ (x2−x1) .

The study of this system can be simplified further by considering the differences
x2− x1. Defining X21 = x2− x1 and R21 = r2− r1, the dynamic of X21 can be
reduced to
dX21
dt
= R21−X21− l1+ l1+ l21+ eβX21 (4.7)
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4.2.1 Case l1 = 0
As a first step and in order to reveal an asymmetry between the two alternatives
we consider the situation where the recommender is restricted to lie only about
the second alternative, i.e., l1 = 0. In l1 = 0 case, (4.7) can be further simplified to
dX21
dt
= R21−X21+ l21+ eβX21 (4.8)
In this case, the number and nature of equilibria is determined by the solutions
of f (X , l2) =−R21, where function f is defined by
f (X , l2) =
l2
1+ eβX
−X
for all X . A rapid study of the function reveals the following:
Lemma 4.2.1. (i) For every value of l2, limX→+∞ f (X , l2)=−∞ and limX→−∞ f (X , l2)=
+∞.
(ii) When l2 ≥− 4β , function f (·, l2) is monotonically decreasing.
(iii) When l2 < − 4β , function f (·, l2) admits a local minimum X∗1 and a local
maximum X∗2 .
Proof. Let gl2(·) = f (·, l2) and define the variable Y = eβX so that
g′l2(X) =−
Y 2+(2+β l2)Y +1
(1+Y )2
.
The sign of the derivative is given by the opposite of the sign of the polynomial
P(Y ) = Y 2 +(2+ β l2)Y + 1 whose discriminant is β l2(4+ β l2). Hence, when
− 4β ≤ l2 ≤ 0, P does not vanish and is positive for all Y . When l2 <− 4β or l2 > 0,
P has two roots
Y ∗1 = (1/2)
(
−2−β l2−
√
β l2(4+β l2)
)
Y ∗2 = (1/2)
(
−2−β l2+
√
β l2(4+β l2)
)
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and is negative on the interval [Y ∗1 ,Y
∗
2 ]. However, observe that these roots are
either both positive, when l2 <− 2β or both negative, when l2≥− 2β . Hence, g′l2(X)
only changes sign when l2 < − 4β , in which case f (·, l2) admits a local minimum
at X∗1 =
1
β lnY
∗
1 and local maximum at X
∗
2 =
1
β lnY
∗
2 .
From item (ii) in Lemma 4.2.1 and the discussion preceding it, it follows that
system (4.7) admits a unique globally asymptotically stable equilibrium whenever
l2 >− 4β , independently of the value of R21. For this reason, this will be called the
unconditional stability region. This is in agreement with sufficient condition (4.6)
applied with K = 2, l1 = 0. However, we also see that global asymptotic stability
can be achieved for other values of l2, depending on the value of R21. Indeed,
from the discussion above, we have the following
Theorem 4.2.2. Let Ω be the subset of the (l2,R21)–plane defined by
Ω= {(l2,R21) | l2 <− 4β ,gl2(X
∗
2 )>−R21 > gl2(X∗1 )},
where
gl2(X
∗
1 ) =
2l2
β l2+
√
β l2(4+β l2)
+
ln
[
−1−β l2/2− (1/2)
√
β l2(4+β l2)
]
β
gl2(X
∗
2 ) =−(β l2+
√
β l2(4+β l2)
+ ln(4)−2ln
(
−2−β l2+
√
β l2(4+β l2)
)
)/(2β ).
System (4.7) admits:
• three equilibrium points (two stable and one unstable one), if and only if
(l2,R21) ∈Ω,
• two equilibrium points (one stable and one saddle–node), if and only if
(l2,R21) ∈ ∂Ω,
• a single globally asymptotically stable equilibrium otherwise.
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A picture of set Ω is provided in Figure 4.1. It can be shown that the lower
part of the boundary is the graph of a concave decreasing function of l2, while the
upper part is the graph of a convex decreasing function of l2.
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Figure 4.1: Framing effect in the two alternative choice model
Going back to the characterization (4.1), one can see that the only constant
strategy inducing equilibrium (pi∗1 ,1− pi∗1 ) with l∗1 = 0 is such that l∗2 = −R21pi∗1 +
1
βpi∗1
ln(1−pi
∗
1
pi∗1
). This means that all the points located on the same straight (blue)
line in Figure 4.1 yield the same equilibrium probability distribution. For this
reason, we refer to each of these curves as an iso–(equilibrium) probability or
iso–pi line.
In addition, note that for a given value of pi∗1 6= 0 and R21, there is a unique
choice of l∗2 imposing the probability distribution (pi
∗
1 ,1− pi∗1 ) in equilibrium,
namely, the abscissa of the unique intersection point between the corresponding
iso–pi and “y = R21” line in the (l2,R21)–plane. As is apparent in Figure 4.1,
this intersection lies in region Ω for some values of pi∗1 and R21 (e.g., pi
∗
1 = 0.3
and R21 = 10) and, hence it is impossible to globally asymptotically stabilize the
corresponding probability distribution with a constant strategy.
From this discussion, it follows that constant recommender strategies with l∗1 =
0 are not always satisfactory, because there exist values of R21 for which a range
of desired probability distributions cannot be globally stabilized by them. Note,
however, that all such values of R21 = r2− r1 are positive. This means that it may
not be possible for the recommender (using constant strategies) to drive the user
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to a state where she prefers the least favorable alternative by misrepresenting only
the value of most favorable alternative. However, it is possible to attain a state
where the least favorable alternative is preferred by lying only about this alterna-
tive, regardless of the values of r2 and r1. In other words, (and to use an analogy
more appropriate for Yelp than, Google Navigation, our original motivation) “ly-
ing about ‘Gourmet Restaurant’ being ‘Fast Food’ may not work, but lying about
‘Fast Food’ being ‘Gourmet Restaurant’ does”! Our model shows that in the
situation where r2  r1 enforcing the desired equilibrium is impossible. When
recommender computes the nudge l2 he wants to create pi∗1 (corresponding to X
∗
21)
the equilibrium he thinks is desirable. But when analyzing the ODE it turns out
that the equilibrium point pi∗1 is unstable, and that the recommender creates two
other stable equilibria pi∗−1 < pi
∗
1 , pi
∗+
1 > pi
∗
1 (corresponding to X
∗−
21 > X
∗
21 and
X∗+21 < X
∗
21. Hence the equilibrium points that are reached depends on the initial
value of the user payoff estimate X021
1. If X021 > X
∗
21 the user reaches pi
∗−
1
2. If X021 < X
∗
21 the user reaches pi
∗+
1
Hence when the true payoff difference is high enough the recommender polarizes
the opinions. Some of the users are not going to be influenced enough to change
their choice while others will be comforted by the nudges.
In the next section, we show that allowing the recommender to lie about both
alternatives removes this difficulty.
4.2.2 General case
Let us now consider constant strategies in which the value of l1 is free. Note that
system (4.7) with l1 6= 0 can be put in the form of (4.8) when replacing R21 and l2
in this latter equation by
R˜21 =R21− l1 (4.9)
l˜2 =l1+ l2. (4.10)
In other words, the dynamics induced by this strategy on a problem with given
value R21 are the same as those induced by a strategy with no lie permitted on the
fist alternative and l˜2, on a system with given value R˜21.
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As a result, the same analysis as in Section 4.2.1 can be carried out in the
(l˜, R˜21)–plane. From this, we see that if, for a given R21, l1 is chosen so that
l˜2 = l1+ l2 ≥− 4β
and
R˜21 = R21− l1 =−pi∗1 l˜2+
1
β
ln(
1−pi∗1
pi∗1
),
for example, then the equilibrium (pi∗1 ,1−pi∗1 ) is created and globally stabilized.
Clearly, these conditions can always be satisfied for fixed R21 and pi∗, since both
l1 are l2 are free parameters. In fact, one can even find the smallest lie in the
unconditional stability region by solving the following quadratic program:
min l21 + l
2
2 (4.11)
s.t. l1+ l2 ≥− 4β (4.12)
R21 = l1−pi∗1 (l2+ l1)+
1
β
ln
(
1−pi∗1
pi∗1
)
, (4.13)
which is always feasible.
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CHAPTER 5
ADAPTIVE LYING STRATEGIES
One might want to consider more generalized recommender strategies than the
constant recommender strategies presented in Section 4, in order to achieve bet-
ter convergence rates in closed–loop. Indeed, it is straightforward to see that a
feedback strategy of the form
l∗a(x) =
x∗a− ra
(1−Πa(x)) , (5.1)
where x∗ is chosen such that Πa(x∗) = pi∗a ∀a ∈ A, globally asymptotically stabi-
lizes the equilibrium x∗. Thus, the closed–loop system is
dxa
dt
= x∗a− xa ∀a ∈ A.
However, feedback strategy (5.1) requires the recommender to access either
the user’s perception vector x, or the probabilities {Πa(x)}, both of which are
not readily available in practice. A surrogate for Πa(x) might be obtained by
monitoring the empirical distribution of the user’s choices up to decision time as
is done, e.g., in fictitious play. We used a slightly different tool that is explained
in details in Section 5.1. In addition, strategy (5.1) has the drawback of requiring
very large lies for initially rarely chosen alternatives, even if the equilibrium value
of their corresponding probability distributions is large – a property not shared by
constant strategies, and inconsistent with the conditions underlying the substantial
non–controlling aspect of a nudge. Furthermore very large lies are unlikely to
be believed and to act as a feasible control strategy. This issue is resolved in
Section 5.3, where a slight modification of this adaptive control strategy makes it
bounded.
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5.1 Estimation of the probability distribution
We now assume the recommender observes the user decision z(n) at each time
step n, and z(n) is a vector whose ath component is 1 if user chooses alternative a
at step n or 0 otherwise. The most important property of z(n), which will be used
extensively is,
E(za(n) | {x}n0) = pia(n). (5.2)
Using stochastic algorithm theory, one can build a probability estimator pia by
averaging the outcome of the random variable z(n) in a new state variable λ (n).
Specifically
λ (n+1) =
(
1− γ(n)
)
λ (n)+ γ(n)z(n), (5.3)
with γ(n) satisfying (2.2), hence λ as→ pi . This estimate of pi is further injected into
the state equation (2.5) to reach the desired equilibrium (x∗1, ...,x
∗
K). In this case,
(2.4) takes the particular form
wa(n) =
ra w.p. Πa
(
x(n)
)
ra+
x∗a−ra
1−λa(n) w.p.
(
1−Πa(x(n))
)
.
(5.4)
Now la =
x∗a−ra
1−λa(n) is a random variable as well as a function of λa, therefore the
best estimator with knowledge of the sequences {xa(s)}ns=0 and {λa(s)}ns=0, is
E(la(n) | {xa(s)}ns=0,{λa(s)}ns=0) =
x∗a− ra
1−λa(n) . (5.5)
Hence,
E
(
wa(n) | {xa(s)}ns=0,{λa(s)}ns=0
)
= ra+(1−Πa(n)) x
∗
a− ra
1−λa(n) . (5.6)
Now we can compute the fluid limit of the discrete dynamical system formed
by (2.5) and (5.3) as
dλa
dt
= pia−λa (5.7)
dxa
dt
= ra− xa+ x
∗
a− ra
1−λa (1−pia) . (5.8)
33
A straightforward idea is to compute the equilibrium of (5.7) and substitute it into
(5.8). However, this technique only works if the two systems evolve on separate
time scales. If they actually evolve on separate time scale, the theory from Borkar
[3] makes a rigorous analysis possible. The main idea of this theory are briefly
summarized next.
5.2 Brief introduction on two time scale dynamics
The convergence rate of γ(n) determines the time scale of the continuous fluid
limit. The faster the sequence γ(n) tends to zero, the less impact new information
has on the state variable. This makes the fluid limit time scale slow, as it takes
significantly more steps to change the state variable value. We suppose that the
payoff estimate of the user (2.5) evolves on a slower time scale than (5.3). Thus
the averaging of the estimate of the probability is sufficiently fast compared to the
evolution of the payoff estimate to accurately describes the probability choice of
the user. Thus averaging factors γ f (n) and γs(n) for the fast and slow dynamics
are such that
lim
n→+∞
γs(n)
γ f (n)
= 0. (5.9)
The two time scale discrete averaging process is now described by
λ (n+1) = (1− γ f (n))λ (n)+ γ f (n)z(n)
x(n+1) = (1− γs(n))x(n)+ γs(n)w(n). (5.10)
5.3 Adaptive control strategy derivation
Consider a choice problem with K alternatives defined by a vector of true re-
ward r = (r1, ...,rK), where the recommender wants to achieve a desired equi-
librium perception x∗ = (x∗1, ...,x
∗
K). Suppose xM(t) = maxa{xa(t)}a∈A, x∗P =
maxa{x∗a}a∈A, rP = maxa{ra}a∈A, and then define
piP =
eβ (max(x
∗
P;rP))
eβ (max(x
∗
P;rP))+∑a6=P eβx
∗
a
(5.11)
δ = min{0.5;piP} (5.12)
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and
fδ :

x 7→ 11−x if x < 1−δ
x 7→ 1δ if x > 1−δ
[0,1] → R.
(5.13)
Theorem 5.3.1. System (5.10) admits an equilibrium corresponding to pi∗ under
the adaptive constant lying strategy if
la(n) = (x∗a− r∗a) fδ (λ (n))a. (5.14)
Proof. The maps of the continuous differential system (5.7) (5.8), are Lipschitz
maps of the state variables x and λ . Indeed the function fδ is Lipschitz with
Lipschitz constant 1/δ 2. When x(t) is fixed, (5.7) has a globally asymptotically
stable equilibrium p(λa) = pia, and p : RA → RA is a Lipschitz map of xa. The
ODE
dxa
dt
= ra− xa+(xi∗a − ra) fp(λ )(x)(1−pia) (5.15)
has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium. The differential equation driving
the state variable xa is
dxa
dt
= ra− xa+(xi∗a − ra) fδ (x)(1−pia). (5.16)
More explicitly
dxa
dt
=

x∗a− xa if pia < 1−δ (5.17a)
ra− xa+ (x
i∗
a − ra)
δ
(1−pia)if pia ≥ 1−δ . (5.17b)
Note that there is at most one xa driven by (5.17b), which can be shown as
follows. Suppose there are two simultaneous states xa1 and xa2 driven by (5.17b),
it then implies that pia1 > 1− δ and pia2 > 1− δ . Now notice that pia1 +pia2 > 1,
which violates the property of a probability distribution. Hence our system of
differential equation can only follow two dynamics, the linear one
dxa
dt
= x∗a− xa ∀a ∈ A, (5.18)
and the one where the maximum state value xM follows (5.17b), making the dif-
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ferential system nonlinear
dxa
dt
= x∗a− xa ∀a 6= M (5.19)
dxM
dt
= rM− xM +(x∗M− rM)
1
δ
(1−piM). (5.20)
Suppose V (x) =maxa6=M | xa−x∗a |, then its derivative is strictly negative. Com-
puting separately the case where xa > x∗a and xa < x∗a we obtain
d | xa− x∗a |
dt
=− | xa− x∗a | (5.21)
Hence dVdt < 0. Suppose ∆ is fixed as ∆ < maxa1 6=a2 | x∗a1 − x∗a2 |, then since V is
positive and strictly decreasing, there exists a time T∆ > 0 such that ∀t ≥ T∆ the
K−1 smallest values of the state satisfy | xa− x∗a |< ∆.
Now suppose xM evolves according to (5.17b) until t → ∞, then depending on
whether x∗M < rM or x∗M > rM, which are fixed parameters, we have
dxM
dt
≤
rM− xM if x∗M < rMx∗M− xM if x∗M > rM . (5.22)
When x∗M < rM define u(t) = xM(t)− rM. Then dudt ≤−u(t) and by Gronwall’s
lemma u(t) ≤ u(T∆)e−t+T∆ . Fixing ε > 0, then there exists Tε1 ∈ [T∆,+∞] such
that u(t) < ε . That is xM− rM < ε . Using similar reasoning there exists Tε2 for
the case x∗M > rM such that xM− rM < ε . When t ≥ max(Tε1;Tε2) = T3 we have
xM < max{rM + ε;x∗M + ε} and | xa− x∗a |< ∆ ∀a 6= M. Hence,
piM(t) =
eβxM
eβxM +∑a 6=M eβxa
(5.23)
≤
max
(
eβ (rM+ε);eβ (x
∗
M+ε)
)
max
(
eβ (rM+ε);eβ (x
∗
M+ε)
)
+∑a6=p eβxa
(5.24)
≤
max
(
eβ (rP+ε);eβ (x
∗
P+ε)
)
max
(
eβ (rP+ε);eβ (x
∗
P+ε)
)
+∑a6=P eβ (x
∗
P)
(5.25)
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Since ∆ and ε can be made arbitrarily small, we can write
piM ≤
max
(
eβ (rP);eβ (x
∗
P)
)
max
(
eβ (rP);eβ (x
∗
P)
)
+∑a6=P eβ (x
∗
P)
(5.26)
Hence there exists T3 such that piM < 1−δ ∀t ≥ T3, therefore xM follows (5.17a)
for t > T3. This contradicts our first assumption. Thus there exists T4 where, if
t > T4, xM is governed by (5.17a), so dxMdt = x
∗
M − xM and | xa− x∗a |≤ ∆. This
implies that xa→ x∗a ∀a. To fully satisfy the assumption of Borkar’s theorem we
also note that supn(|| xn ||+ || yn ||)< ∞ a.s..
Now, note that our work also gives us a bound on the gain used for controlling
the system, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3.2. Nudges used in the adaptive lying strategy are bounded and
∀a ∈ A,
la ≤ | x
∗
a− ra |
δ
. (5.27)
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CHAPTER 6
CREDIBILITY
This section introduces a new feature in our model that is a credibility notion.
Considering the user always believes the recommender announcements is a prac-
tical limitation of the model developed in Section 2. Since the user experiences the
true noisy reward r˜a(n) when she chooses strategy a at step n, she realizes the rec-
ommender gave her misleading information (see Figure 6.1). If the recommender
wants his recommendations to be followed he must have a certain accuracy. The
user indeed makes an opinion on how credible the recommender is to decide if
recommenders announcements are useful or misleading. This adds a notion of
credibility which reduces the set of nudges used to influence a user, making our
model more realistic. Large lies (with respect to a certain metric we will introduce
in Section 6.1) cannot be used, as they make the recommender not credible and
therefore diminishing his influence.
6.1 Credibility metric
We assume the user observes errors made by planner v(n) at each time step n.
The variable v(n) is a random variable representing the quadratic nudge at step n,
specifically
v(n) = (ra(n)− (ra(n)+ la(n)))2 w.p.pia(n). (6.1)
The expectation of v(n) conditioned on {x(n)}n0 is given by
E(v(n) | {x}n0) =
K
∑
a=1
pia(n)la(n)2. (6.2)
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The user averages the outcome of the random variable v(n) in a new state variable
y(n), which tracks the credibility of the recommender. Specifically
y(n+1) = (1− γ(n))y(n)+ γ(n)v(n), (6.3)
with γ(n) satisfying (2.2). Again taking the fluid limit of this equation, the asymp-
totic behavior is tracked by
dy
dt
=
A
∑
a=1
(la)
2pia− y (6.4)
Note that if an equilibrium y∗ of (6.4) exists, it is the expected quadratic lie at
equilibrium. In other words, the credibility y is the sum of all lies weighted by the
probability user experiences them at equilibrium. As a rule of thumb, the closer
y∗ is to zero, the more credible the recommender is. Hence for maintaining high
credibility, the recommender may lie a lot about alternatives that are rarely chosen
at equilibrium and try to tell the truth about the alternatives that are often chosen
at equilibrium. An influential recommender tries to maintain high credibility as it
simplifies his work for nudging the user. Since in such a setting the recommender
may lie at every step to modify the payoff estimate of the user, one might argue
that the user will never trust him. One shall remember the values announced by
recommender are estimated values, therefore the user cannot expect these values
to be totally accurate. The user listens to the recommender as long as he gives
useful hints. Hence as long as the recommender is making ”Bona Fide” errors,
errors which stay in acceptable boundaries, he keeps his credibility high.
6.2 From the credibility value of the recommender to
the perception of user
To decide whether or not she believes the recommender, the user considers the
value of y(n). She transforms this y(n) value into a probability value η with
η(y(n)) = 1 corresponding to a fully credible recommender and η(y(n)) = 0 cor-
responding to a untrusted recommender. More precisely we consider η to be a
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piecewise linear function,
η(y) =

R+ → [0,1]
y 7→ 1 if y < T
y 7→ T−y∆T +1 if T ≤ y≤ T +∆T
y 7→ 0 else.
(6.5)
Note that η is a decreasing continuous function of y, which is consistent with
its definition, because the more recommender lies the bigger y is. The function
η is characterized by two parameters T and ∆T representing the user tolerance
to error. The variable T is the user absolute tolerance while ∆T is her relative
tolerance. As long as y is inferior to the absolute tolerance T the user totally
trusts the recommender. When y > T the recommender starts loosing credibility,
making η linearly decrease to zero. Note that the relative tolerance ∆T determines
the slope of the line.
6.3 System dynamics when adding credibility
When adding credibility, the announced reward (2.4) is unchanged but the experi-
enced reward changes. This experienced reward ω differs from (2.4) because the
user decides whether he takes into account the planner recommendations or not.
Based on the experienced reward ω and her credibility estimate of the planner y,
the user updates her payoff perception vector as follows
xa(n+1) = (1− γ(n))xa(n)+ γ(n)ωa(n), (6.6)
where
ωa(n) =

ra(n) w.p. pia(n)
ra(n)+ la(n) w.p. (1−pia(n))η(n)
xa(n) w.p. (1−pia(n))(1−η(n)).
(6.7)
In words the user at time step n chooses alternative a and can update her payoff
estimate vector x in two different manners:
• She updates xa with its true reward and the others with the announced re-
ward w, when she trusts recommender (see Figure 6.3).
• She updates xa, the alternative she experienced, with its true reward ra and
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does not update the others with the announced reward, because she distrusts
recommender (see Figure 6.4).
We are now ready to take the fluid limit of this new model with credibility
defined by (6.3) and (6.6). Calling upon Corollary 4 by [3], we can state the
following.
Proposition 6.3.1. Suppose that the only internally chain transitive invariant sets
of the system of ordinary differential equations
dxa
dt
= E(ωa(x) | {xa(s)}ns=0,{ya(s)}ns=0)− xa
dya
dt
= E(va(x) | {xa(s)}ns=0,{ya(s)}ns=0)− ya (6.8)
more explicitly written as
dxa
dt
= piara+(1−pia)(η (la+ ra)+(1−η)xa)− xa
dya
dt
=
A
∑
a=1
pia (la)2− ya (6.9)
are isolated equilibrium points. Then the sequences {x(n)}n≥0, {y(n)}n≥0 of ran-
dom vectors defined by (6.3) and (6.6) converge almost surely to one of these
equilibria.
In the following subsections, we will focus on system (6.9).
6.4 Reachable sets with credibility one when using
constant lies
The central question of interest is to determine what equilibrium sets are reach-
able with full credibility, which is equivalent to determine the set of reachable
equilibria when lies are bounded. The idea is to separate the analysis of the x and
y dynamics in system (6.9) and to check self-consistency of the final result. The
x dynamic is investigated under full credibility assumption (η = 1), determining
a possible equilibrium x∗. This equilibrium is then injected into the y dynamic to
check whether it is consistent. If it is constant, using results of Chapter 4 we can
infer which equilibria can be reached with credibility one.
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6.4.1 Model with two alternatives
Chapter 4 investigated a constant lying strategy without credibility. We concluded
that it was always possible to enforce an equilibrium by choosing an appropriate
set of two lies. Since there was one free parameter we could find the minimum set
of lies with respect to a certain metric. Because of the credibility choice (6.4), the
interesting metric is the sum of the quadratic lies weighted by the probability they
will be encountered at equilibrium. Hence for reaching pi∗1 the desired equilibrium
one solves the QP
min pi∗1 l
2
1 +(1−pi∗1 )l22 (6.10)
s.t. l1+ l2 ≥− 4β (6.11)
R21 = l1−pi∗1 (l2+ l1)+
1
β
ln
(
1−pi∗1
pi∗1
)
, (6.12)
to obtain the minimum objective value p∗ that we specifically compare with user’s
absolute tolerance T define in Section 6.2. If p∗ > T the equilibrium is not self
consistent since the credibility is less than one. However if p∗< T the equilibrium
is self consistent and thus reachable with credibility one using the values of l∗1 and
l∗2 output by QP (6.10).
6.4.2 Model with three alternatives
A bound on the reachable set can also be obtained for the model with three al-
ternatives. Calling upon Proposition 4.1.4, one determines an absolute stabil-
ity region for the lies. This region B is the union of twenty four convex sets,
B( j) j∈{1,..,24}. To prove it, it suffices to consider separately the twenty four cases
that (l1, l2, l3) satisfies. Given a desired payoff perception (x∗1,x
∗
2,x
∗
3) resulting in
a desired probability choice (pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2 ,pi
∗
3 ), our algorithm looks for a feasible set of
lies in B, searching in every B( j) j∈{1,..,24} separately. For a fixed j ∈ {1, ..,24}
the problem
min
l1,l2,l3
3
∑
a=1
(ra− x∗a+ la(1−pi∗a ))2
s.t. (l1, l2, l3) ∈ B( j) (6.13)
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is a convex problem. Hence it admits a unique minimum (l∗1( j), l
∗
2( j), l
∗
3( j)) that
corresponds to a value p∗( j). However the solution to QP (6.13) only gives a
valid solution for the equilibrium problem, if p∗( j)' 0 because in this case ra−
x∗a + l∗a( j)(1− pi∗a ) ' 0. So among the 24 solutions only a few are relevant to
our original problem. Setting a threshold ρ we discard all the solutions that do
not satisfy p∗( j) < ρ . This gives us the set of actual solutions A a subset of
B. If A is the null set the problem of finding a set of lies enforcing the desired
equilibrium with full credibility is infeasible. If not we then want to find the
minimum credibility value in set A, we solve
min
j∈A
pi∗1 l
2
1( j)+pi
∗
2 l
2
2( j)+pi
∗
3 l
2
3( j) (6.14)
which gives the index j∗ corresponding to the minimum credibility value. This
credibility is then compared with the tolerance threshold T , determining whether
the equilibrium is credible or not.
6.5 Reachable sets with credibility one when using
adaptive lies
Adapting our credibility theory presented at the beginning of Chapter 6, we can
develop an equivalent technique to deal with credibility in the adaptive strategy
presented in Chapter 5. When an adaptive lying strategy is adopted by recom-
mender the equations (6.3) and (2.1) are modified to become
λ (n+1) =
(
1− γ f (n)
)
λ (n)+ γ f (n)z(n) (6.15)
x(n+1) = (1− γs(n))x(n)+ γs(n)ω(n) (6.16)
y(n+1) = (1− γs(n))y(n)+ γs(n)v(n) (6.17)
where z(n), ω(n) and v(n) are defined in (5.2), (6.1), (6.7), and the averaging
factors γ f , γs satisfy (2.2). Note that (6.16) and (6.17) evolve on the slow time
scale while the estimator (6.15), evolves on the fast one. For the sake of clarity
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we recompute the conditional expectation of v(n),
E(v(n) | {x(s)}ns=0,{y(s)}ns=0,{λ (s))}ns=0, (6.18)
=
A
∑
a
pia (ra+(x∗a− ra) fδ (λ )− ra)2 , (6.19)
=
A
∑
a
pia ((x∗a− ra) fδ (λ ))2 . (6.20)
Using fδ definition we get
E(vn | {x}n≥0,{y}n≥0,{λ (n))}n≥0 ≤
1
δ 2
A
∑
a
pia (x∗a− ra)2 , (6.21)
from which follows
Theorem 6.5.1. Given the discrete dynamic equations (6.16), (6.17) and true re-
ward (6.7), if
A
∑
a=1
pi∗a (x
∗
a− r∗a)2 ≤ δ 2(x∗a,r∗a)T (6.22)
then the equilibrium x∗ is reachable with credibility one.
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6.6 Figures
Figure 6.1: Credibility mechanism: How the user identifies the recommender is
not accurate
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Figure 6.2: The η function, the function describing the probability the user
believes the recommender
Figure 6.3: Update when the user trusts the recommender
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Figure 6.4: Update when the user does not trust the recommender
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CHAPTER 7
SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL
RESULTS
7.1 Constant lying strategies
7.1.1 Model with two alternatives
Figure 7.1 shows the credibility value obtained when solving QP (6.10). Left axis
displays pi1 the choice probability that would have normally occurred if l1, l2 = 0,
right axis displays pi∗1 the probability at equilibrium when the user got influenced
by the recommender through (l∗1 , l
∗
2). Note that there is a bijection between pi1
and r2− r1 and between pi∗1 and x∗2− x∗1. The z axis represents the value of the
credibility metric. Given the absolute tolerance T of a user to the lies, one draws
the plane Z = T . It separates Figure 7.1 curve in two region one above and one
under the former plane. The preimage of the under part is the set of reachable
equilibrium with credibility one.
We also plotted in Figure 7.2 the lies the recommender uses to take user to the
desired equilibrium.
7.1.2 Model with three alternatives
Using (6.13) the absolute stability region given by (4.6) is represented in Figure
7.3 for true reward vector r = (1,2,3). Hence without any recommender influence
in this setting the equilibrium probability would be (pi1,pi2,pi3)=(0.09,0.24,0.67).
Running (6.14) Figure 7.4 shows the minimum credibility metric value pi∗1 l
2
1 +
pi∗2 l
2
2 + pi
∗
3 l
2
3 to achieve the desired probability (pi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2 ,pi
∗
3 ) (as a convention the
unreachable probability are given a credibility metric of -10). The x and y axis of
figure 7.4 represent probabilities pi∗1 and pi
∗
2 at equilibrium when the recommender
actively influences the user choice.
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The lies corresponding to the minimum credibility metric are displayed in Fig-
ure 7.4.
To illustrate the efficiency of the method we simulate a stochastic discrete pro-
cess. The recommender wants to drive pi = [0.09,0.24,0.67] to pi∗= [0.41,0.29,0.5]
using γ(n) = 1/(n+1). Reading Figure 7.5 the constant lying strategy driving the
system to equilibrium is l = [2.022,−0.2016,−1.619].
Figure 7.6 shows a simulation of 10 users who start from a different perception
randomly drawn. We investigate the convergence under the L1 norm, i.e.
Error Metric =
A
∑
a=1
| pia(n)−pi∗a | (7.1)
7.2 Adaptive lying strategies
Unlike the constant lying strategy, the adaptive lying strategy is readily applicable
for any number of alternatives. We simulate the stochastic discrete process with
γs(n) = 1/(n+1). As suggested by Borkar [3] we tried different averaging factors
of the form γ f (n)= 1/(n+1)1/2+α where α varied from 0 to 1/2. Little difference
was found between the α , and we eventually adopt α = 110 . The convergence
metric for the probability estimate is
Error Metric =
A
∑
a=1
| λa(n)−pia(n) | (7.2)
where λ is defined by (5.3).
Figure 7.8 shows the convergence of the probability while Figure 7.9 displays
the convergence of the estimator running on a faster time scale.
7.3 Discrete simulation with credibility
Investigating the same situation (i.e r = (1,2,3) wants to be driven to
pi∗ = (0.41,0.29,0.5)) we add credibility to our model. The simulation is still
run with ten users having different starting point. For the constant lying strategy
the credibility value at equilibrium is y∗ = 2.47. For the adaptive lying strategy
a bound on the credibility value at equilibrium is y∗ ≤ 6.46. We fix to one the
49
relative tolerance ∆T , while we vary the absolute tolerance T of all users simul-
taneously. For the constant lying case T ranges from 1/2 to 4, for the adaptive
lying case it ranges from 3 to 12. Results are displayed in Figure 7.7a and Figure
7.7b. As we expected when the absolute tolerance is inferior to the credibility
value at equilibrium another equilibrium is created. This equilibrium with mixed
credibility is difficult to compute and its stability cannot be readily characterized.
7.4 Figures
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Figure 7.4: Minimum Credibility for the model with three alternatives.
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Figure 7.6: Simulation of the discrete process representing the model with three
alternatives, when using constant strategy and no credibility is involved
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Figure 7.7: Simulations showing equilibria that do not correspond to full
credibility
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Figure 7.8: Convergence plot to desired equilibrium for adaptive lying strategy
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Figure 7.9: Convergence plot of the probability estimate for the model using
adaptive lying strategy
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Inspired by the concept of a nudge introduced by Thaler [7], we investigated the
possibility of influencing the perception of a decision-making agent by providing
her possibly misleading information. Adapting a model from Cominetti [1], we
considered an agent based learning procedure in which the agent receives informa-
tion directly as well as through an untrusted recommender. Our main contributions
are
• Development of open loop lying strategies that are constant
The infinite stochastic averaging process can be asymptotically tracked
by an ODE, provided the only invariant chain transitive sets are iso-
lated equilibrium. We hence studied the stability of the equilibrium
point of the ODE. Using Gershgorin theorem we derived sufficient
stability conditions for a constant lying strategy to enforce a desired
equilibrium. When only two alternatives are present, we uncovered an
interesting framing effect. Making first alternative looks better than it
actually is, is not equivalent to make the second one looks worse than
it is.
• Extension to closed loop control strategies, called adaptive strategies
Unlike constant control strategies, adaptive strategies can enforce any
desired equilibrium. There is no framing effect associated with those,
since any equilibrium is a globally asymptotic stable equilibrium. In
addition these adaptive control strategies are bounded.
• Extension of the initial model to introduce a notion of credibility
A major limitation of the model developed in Chapters 4 and 5 is that
the user always believe the recommender. To overcome this limita-
tion we introduced a measure of credibility which effectively bounded
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the lies. Credibility of the recommender was modeled by a discrete
stochastic process (6.3). This process averaged the errors between
what the recommender announced and what was truly observed by the
user. As long as the credibility value was below a certain bound, the
user would still listen to the recommender. But when this credibility
value exceeded the bound, the user would only occasionally believe
the recommender resulting in a different equilibrium in practice. The
interesting result coming out of this model is that not every possible
equilibrium point are reachable. The credibility feedback makes other
equilibrium pop up, forcing the recommender to reconsider his lying
strategies.
Further directions for future work still need to be explored.
• Extension of these results to a multi agent congestion games This prob-
lem appears challenging for the reason already highlighted in Cominetti [1]:
Finding the equilibrium requires to compute the fixed point of an in-
volved function.
The ODE that asymptotically tracks the discrete process is highly non
linear, which complicates the stability analysis.
A first step in that direction was made by Mello [11] who used a congestion
tolling strategy to make a network of parallel arc system optimal.
• Exploration of others averaging process. If the importance of the experi-
ence do not decrease over time, the ODE tracks the process only in a prob-
abilistic sense, which is described in Chapter 9 of Borkar [3]. One could
also think about using a moving averaging process, which would force us
to change the mathematical model and especially the use of stochastic algo-
rithms.
• Conduct an experiment Our theory still needs to be confirmed by exper-
imental results, especially the validity of the payoff based learning proce-
dure. That is why an experiment must come along with a study of the sensi-
tivity of our learning model. Indeed, the model we used describes the equi-
librium of a decision process when this decision process is repeated over
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a long period of time (the ODE tracks the discrete model only asymptoti-
cally). The biggest concern is whether or not the discrete process is repeated
over a long enough period of time for our results to be meaningful.
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APPENDIX A
GERSHGORIN THEOREM
Let A be a complex n×n matrix, with entries ai j. For i∈{1, ,n} let Ri =∑ j 6=i | ai j |
be the sum of the absolute values of the non-diagonal entries in the ith row. Let
D(aii,Ri) be the closed disc centered at aii with radius Ri. Such a disc is called a
Gershgorin disc.
Theorem A.0.1. Every eigenvalue of A lies within at least one of the Gershgorin
discs D(aii,Ri)[12].
Proof. Let λ be an eigenvalue of A and let x = (x1,x2, ...,xn)T be the correspond-
ing normalized eigenvector. We define M as the index of the largest eigenvec-
tor component, M = maxi∈{1,..,n} | xi |. Note that by definition of an eigenvector
xM 6= 0. Now, since
Ax = λx (A.1)
we get
n
∑
j=1
ai jx j = λxM (A.2)
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so that
(λ −aMM)xM =
n
∑
j=1, j 6=M
ai jx j (A.3)
|λ −aMM|= (1/ | xM |)
∣∣∣∣∣ n∑j=1, j 6=M ai jx j
∣∣∣∣∣ (A.4)
| λ −aMM |=
∣∣∣∣∣ n∑j=1, j 6=M ai j(x j/xM)
∣∣∣∣∣ (A.5)
| λ −aMM | ≤
n
∑
j=1, j 6=M
| ai j | (A.6)
| λ −aMM | ≤ Ri (A.7)
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APPENDIX B
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF STOCHASTIC
AVERAGING THEORY
B.1 One time scale dynamics
Consider a discrete stochastic process given by
xn+1 = xn+a(n) [h(xn)+Mn+1] ,n≥ 0 (B.1)
where the following assumptions are satisfied:
(A1) The map h : Rd → Rd is Lipschitz
(A2) Stepsizes {a(n)} are positive scalars satisfying
∑
n
a(n) = ∞, ∑
n
a(n)2 < ∞ (B.2)
(A3) {M(n)} is a martingale difference sequence with respect to the increasing
family of σ −− fields.
Fn = σ(xm,Mm,m≤ n) = σ(x0,M1, ...,Mn),n≥ 0. (B.3)
That is
E [Mn+1 | Fn] = 0 a.s., n≥ 0 (B.4)
Furthermore,{Mn} are square-integrable with
E
[||Mn+1 ||2| Fn]≤ K(1+ || xn ||2) a.s., n≥ 0, (B.5)
for some constant K ≥ 0
(A4) The iterates of (B.1) remain bounded a.s., i.e.,
supn || xn ||< ∞, a.s.. (B.6)
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Then the following theorem taken from Borkar [3] holds.
Theorem B.1.1. Almost surely, the sequence {xn} generated by (B.1) converges to
a (possibly sample path dependent) compact connected internally chain transitive
invariant set of (B.1).
This implies the following
Corollary B.1.2. If the only internally chain transitive invariant sets for (B.1) are
isolated equilibrium points, then {xn} a.s. converges to a possibly sample path
dependent equilibrium point.
B.2 Two time scale dynamics
Suppose we have the following discrete process
y(n+1) = y(n)+ γ f (n) [g(x(n),y(n))] (B.7)
x(n+1) = x(n)+ γs(n) [h(x(n),y(n))] . (B.8)
Where γ f and γs satisfy the following properties:
∞
∑
n=1
γs(n) =
∞
∑
n=1
γ f (n) = ∞,
∞
∑
n=1
γ(n)2s + γ(n)
2
f < ∞,
γs(n)
γ f (n)
→ 0 (B.9)
The third property of (B.9) implies that γs tends to zero faster than γ f . It means
that the new experiences under γs have less importance than the one used under
γn. It implies that the discrete system using γs(n) will move slower than the one
using γ f (n). The ODE limit of this two time scale is a coupled system with a fast
and slow time scale:
y˙(t) =
1
ε
g(x(t),y(t)) (B.10)
x˙(t) = h(x(t),y(t)) (B.11)
Due to the fast dynamic of (B.10), one studies the equilbrium of (B.11) under the
hypothesis that x is is fixed to the equilibrium value of (B.10), i.e.
y˙(t) = g(x,y(t)) . (B.12)
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This equation has an equilibrium y∗ = λ (x) that is injected into (B.11) to obtain a
non coupled differential equation
x˙(t) = h(x(t),λ (x(t))) (B.13)
which only depends on x(t) and hence is easier to study.
In a more formal way:
Proposition B.2.1. Suppose
A (B.12) has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium λ (x) (uniformely in
x) where λ is a Lipschitz Map.
B The o.d.e (B.13) has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium x∗.
Then (y(n),x(n)) as→ (λ (x∗),x∗).
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